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A VALUE ARGUMENT AGAINST INCOMPATIBILISM

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Abstract:
Incompatibilism is the view that free will is incompatible with determinism. Combatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. The debate between the two positions is seemingly intractable. However, just as elsewhere in philosophy, leveraging assumptions about value can offer progress. A promising value argument against incompatibilism is as follows: given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilism is false. This is because we would want our choices to be free but we also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices. Hence freedom can't require a lack of determinism.

Keywords:
Value, free will, incompatibilism, compatibilism, determinism, human psychology

A Value Argument Against Incompatibilism

Incompatibilism is a view of the nature of free will according to which an action cannot be both free and determined.[1] Libertarianism and hard determinism both entail incompatibilism. Compatibilism is the more popular view of the nature of free will according to which it is possible for an action to be both free and determined.[2] This paper offers a value argument against incompatibilism. The argument, in short, is that since we would want our choices to be free but we also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices, it follows that freedom can't require a lack of determinism. It is easiest to appreciate the force of this argument by first comparing it to value arguments in other areas of philosophy.

1. Value-Driven Philosophy

Sometimes philosophers use claims about value to invalidate claims about something's true nature. Such a procedure can be called value-driven philosophy. In value-driven philosophy, a premise about the value or disvalue of a certain state of affairs is taken as evidence for or against a particular philosophical position. Here are three examples, the first from ethics.

What makes a life well-lived? An initially attractive answer is that a life well-lived is one in which a person has a sufficient amount of satisfying experiences. Thought experiments like Nozick's Experience Machine suggest otherwise.[3] Very few people would want to enter the experience machine for the rest of their lives (regardless of the amount of satisfying experiences that it would provide). The fact that we wouldn't want to do this indicates that our concept of a life well-lived includes more than mere satisfying experiences. Hence, a premise about what we *want* can elucidate something's *nature*. In this case, what we want suggests that certain concepts of the nature of the good life are mistaken (e.g. hedonistic theories).

Next consider a value argument from the domain of epistemology. Some years ago, epistemology underwent a change of pace that has come to be known as the value turn in epistemology (e.g. Kvanvig 2003).[4] In essence, value-driven epistemology approaches traditional problems in epistemology by making explicit two underlying questions: (1) what are the values or goals investigated in the domain of epistemology and (2) how well do current solutions to epistemic problems meet those goals? For example, knowledge is supposed to be more valuable than mere true belief—if we had to choose whether to know something or merely truly believe it, most of us would prefer the former. But some accounts of knowledge have been criticized as being unable to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or other cognitive states.[5]

Finally, there are value-driven arguments in metaphysics, too. In his classic paper "The Self and the Future," Bernard Williams (1970) employs premises about what we value and fear in an argument for the nature of personal identity. Suppose you have it on good authority that you will be tortured tomorrow. You naturally fear this event. You want to avoid it at all costs. Now suppose you learn that your memories will be wiped before the torture. Would you still want to avoid it? Yes. You continue to fear the upcoming torture regardless of the sorts of changes to the various different psychological changes proposed by Williams. And the fact that you continue to fear it and want something else is taken as evidence that it would be YOU who suffer at the hands of the torturer. Here again an assumption about what we want is used as evidence against a thesis about something's nature. This is value-driven philosophy at its best.

In all three cases, the claims about what we value function as concept "locators." In many philosophical debates, there are many different concepts that are indicated by a single linguistic expression (example: justification). Reflecting on what we value helps us to home in on the concept that is relevant for a certain area

of discourse. So, for example, value arguments about knowledge in epistemology function by "finding" the concept of knowledge that we care about and then showing whether contemporary accounts of the nature of this concept can explain why it is valuable.

The remainder of this paper applies this sort of value-driven methodology to the debate over free will.When it comes to free will, we should ask whether we would really want any of what contemporary metaphysicians are serving up. I argue that—at least when it comes to incompatibilist accounts of free will—the answer is no. And this should tell us something about the truth of those accounts.

2. Free Will: Its Nature and Value

Any value-driven argument should start with a brief description of the agreed-upon territory. With regard to free will, this means setting aside four points of broad consensus. First, let's stipulate that an event is determined when a (non-trivial) sufficient condition for that event is realized. If a state of affairs S is a sufficient condition for a state of affairs T, then the realization of S is a determining factor for T. This bare schema says nothing about the nature of the states of affairs conditions in question—the determining factor might be a matter of logic, theological knowledge, a combination of physical states and laws of nature, or whatever.

Second, free actions are those that are up to us to perform. One way of putting this point is to say that we act freely only when we could have done otherwise.[6]Of course, this bare commitment leaves open whether free will is compatible with determinism given counterfactual analyses of 'could have done otherwise'.[7] That it is why even incompatibilists grant this bare-bones conception of free will.[8]

Third, there is broad agreement on the relevant components of human psychology when it comes to free agency. A rough, but still useful, sketch is as follows:

Experience → Mental States → Choice → Action

In order not to beg any questions, the sketch must be construed very broadly. So, for example, 'experience'includes all elements of conscious experiences like intuitions, perceptual experiences, pleasures, impulses, etc. and 'mental states' should include beliefs, desires, "b-sires," etc. Similarly, the arrow (→) must be understood in a very loose way so that it is not read as 'causes' or 'determines'.

Note that even agent causal and non-causal accounts of free will are compatible with this broad sketch. Agent causal accounts posit the existence of substances separate from any given event; these substances are the proximate causes of free action (e.g. Chisholm 1976). Non-causal accounts of free will require that free action be genuinely uncaused or be caused by basic mental actions like volitions or choices that are themselves uncaused (e.g. Ginet 1990). But on either picture, there must be *some* sort of connection between mental states and choices and choices and action. A view of psychology in which there is literally no connection—not even a probabilistic or reason-providing connection—between any two of these features would be unintelligible.

In other words, this basic sketch need not go as far as Mele 1992 by insisting that the connection *must* be causal. At this point all we need to grant is that there is at least a probabilistic or conceptual or basing relation here. In Leibniz's infamous terminology, perhaps our mental states incline without necessitating our choices—and even Chisholm is willing to grant that. Otherwise, it's a complete mystery why behavior is sometimes predictable and why we cite mental states in our explanations of our choices.

Fourth, philosophers largely agree that free will is valuable.[9] Though there is large disagreement on why free will is valuable, the fact that it is valuable is not under serious contention.[10] The free will debate is important because so much hangs on whether we are free. Everyone wants to be free. Even many free will skeptics seem to agree that it *would* be good to be free despite the fact that we are not (e.g. Strawson 2010, p. 272).

Note that this assumption is simply that free will—whatever its nature turns out to be—is valuable. It's not a claim about "libertarian free will" or "compatibilist free will"—whatever those terms denote (and van Inwagen 2008 argues that such labels are misnomers that only lead to conceptual confusion in the free will debate). Instead, the paper relies only on the assumption that free will simpliciter is valuable, and follows this assumption with an argument that libertarian accounts of the nature of free will cannot accommodate this assumption.

3. The Value Argument against Incompatibilism

The thesis of this paper is that incompatibilism about free will is false, and the argument is an example of a value-driven rejection of a metaphysical thesis. Given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilist analyses of free will are mistaken. The argument is an instance of the general schema illustrated in §1:

1. Free will is valuable.[11]

2. But if incompatibilist analyses of free will are correct, then free will is NOT valuable.

3. Therefore, incompatibilist analyses of free will are mistaken.

If the argument presented here is sound, value-driven metaphysics shows that incompatibilism is false and explains this mistake in terms of what we *want* (as opposed to other objections in the literature that explain the falsity of incompatibilism in terms of luck, control, ultimate source, etc.).[12]

It is important to note that this argument is not merely saying that we cannot see what indeterminism adds to the nature of free will. Other philosophers have made that point clearly enough. Rather, the point is that we CAN see what indeterminism adds, and what it adds is something that is not valuable.This is a new critique of incompatibilism.

3.1 The Minor Premise

Since these two premises lead validly to the conclusion that incompatibilism is mistaken, the only open question is the truth of the premises. The first premise of this argument is beyond reproach. As noted above, virtually all participants in the free will debate agree that free will would be a valuable thing to have. Of course, it is up to an intractable incompatibilist to argue against premise one with a G.E. Moore shift:

1'. An incompatibilist analysis of free will is correct.

2. But if incompatibilist analyses of free will are correct, then free will is NOT valuable.

3'. Therefore, free will is not valuable.[13]

This sort of reply is open to any argument in philosophy. The crucial question is one of plausibility: are we more certain that free will (whatever it is) is a good thing or that a certain minority view of the nature of free will is correct? Sure the former—if free will is not valuable, it's hard to explain why we care so much about its nature! And if the former, then premise one is unimpeachable on G.E. Moore grounds. And if someone truly thinks that free will is not valuable, that's a good indication that she is not talking about the same capacity that everyone else in the free will debate is talking about. So premise one is secure.

3.2 The Major Premise

Premise two is defended by the following methodology: no matter where indeterminism is introduced in the psychology of human action, it's a bad thing. We would not want indeterminism anywhere in the historical sequence of our actions, and, if given the choice, we would ensure that each link is as deterministic as possible.

Here is the defense in more detail. According to incompatibilism, indeterminism is an essential ingredient in free action. Where is this indeterminism located? As §2 makes clear, there are only three unique possibilities:

Experience → Mental States → Choice → Action

If there is some ind=eterminism in this picture, it must occur (A) at the link between choice and action, (B) at the link between mental states and choices, (C) at the link between experience and mental states, or at more than one of these links. This section explores each of these options to see whether we would value indeterminism at any of the links.

Consider first the link between choice and action. Philosophers all agree that there must be some sort of link between our choices and our actions. The difference between my picking up a cup (an action) and my leg twitching as I fall asleep (a non-action) is that the first is the result of a mental choice. The lesson is that if some bodily event lacks the appropriate mental intention, will, or choice, then it's not really an action in the first place. So, given that there must be some sort of connection between choice and action, we can ask how tight we would want this connection to be.

And the answer is pretty obvious: as tight as possible. In fact, it seems silly to want anything less than determinism here. Remember: determinism is the realization

of a (non-trivial) sufficient condition. Given this, we obviously want our actions to be the result of the choices that we make, full-stop. In an ideal world, our choices would be sufficient conditions for our actions. To choose to pick up the cup would be enough for my body to execute the action of picking up the cup.

We can illustrate this preference with a thought experiment. Suppose someone offers you the following drug. Upon taking the pill, the link between your choices and your actions would become indeterministic. Sometimes you would choose to pick up a glass, but instead you will smash the glass. Other times you will choose to turn your car to the right, but you will turn to the left instead. Or perhaps the indeterminism doesn't manifest itself in a contrary action but simply no action at all: you choose to pick up your fork but instead sit there staring at your plate. Would you take such a drug? No. No rational agent would take a drug that imposed indeterminism at the link between choice and action, and hence such indeterminism would not be valuable.

In fact, I think we can say something stronger. Not only would you NOT take a pill that would render this connection indeterministic, you WOULD take a pill that would render this connection deterministic. If there were a drug available that would guarantee that my choices were sufficient conditions for my actions, I would surely take it. It would give me the strongest guarantee possible that my choices had the effect that I intended them to have.

Consider next the link between mental states and choices. Again, philosophers all agree that there must be some sort of link between our beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. and the choices that we make. If a choice is totally disconnected from what an agent wants, believes, etc., then it's very hard to see how the choice is really the agent's in the first place. We might say that choices *just are* the manifestation of a will that is driven by certain mental components. So, given that there must be some sort of connection between choice and action, we can again ask how tight we would want this connection to be.

And the answer here is no less obvious than in the first case: as tight as possible. We want our choices to be the result of what we want, believe, etc. In fact, surely this value judgment is what ultimately underlies our revulsion to cases of coercion. In coercion, what an agent does is (in some way) disconnected to what she wants, believes, etc. Instead, it is someone else's beliefs and desires that are prompting the action. The bank teller didn't *want* to hand over the money, but the gunman demanded it of her. Free action isn't like that at all. We want our mental states to be sufficient conditions for our choices.

We find more evidence of this value judgment when we consider another version of the drug thought experiment. Suppose there were a drug that would render the link between your mental states and your choices indeterministic: your mental states wouldn't be sufficient for your choices. Given your beliefs and desires, maybe you would make a certain choice, but maybe not. Perhaps you will believe that chocolate gelato is the best flavor and want to purchase a scoop of the best flavor but find yourself choosing strawberry. Or—tocapture a case in which indeterminism doesn't

manifest itself in a contrary action but simply no action at all—you will find yourself wanting to turn on your computer and believing that pushing the power button will turn it on (and have no competing desires or goals) but choose to sit an stare at your desk. In effect, your mental states will not be sufficient conditions for your choices. It's a scary prospect. No one in her right mind would take such a pill. And, like the case above, we can say something stronger. Not only would you NOT take a pill that would render this connection indeterministic, you WOULD take a pill that would render this connection deterministic. And so, once again, we find that we wouldn't want indeterminism introduced in this link of the sketch of human psychology.

Against this, Robert Kane introduces examples where indeterminism between the mental and the choice is supposed to be a good thing (e.g. Kane 2005). For example, Kane describes the case of a businesswoman who is late for an important meeting but has the opportunity to help a stranded motorist. She wrestles with what to do, and whatever her decision, it will affect her future character in what Kane calls a Self-Forming Action. Her deliberative process is indetermined, and yet she exercises a certain sort of voluntary control on the outcome, no matter what it is. Hence, indeterminism is supposed to be a good thing.

Examples such as these are not persuasive. As noted above, there must be some sort of connection between one's reasons, desires, etc. and one's choices (even if the connection is not causal). Given this connection, we face a dilemma. Like the businesswoman, suppose I am deliberating between two courses of action, A or B. If my reasons, desires, etc. are stronger for A than for B, then I would not want to introduce indeterminism into the picture.[14] I would want the stronger reason or desire to win out. Nothing is gained by being constituted such that in some scenarios my weaker reasons or desires trump the stronger ones.

On the other hand, suppose that my reasons, desires, etc. are of equal strength. Here again, adding indeterminism to the picture doesn't help matters. If my course of action isn't settled by my reasons, desires, etc., then any number of ways of resolving the standoff are equally good: have one win out by an indeterministic process, have the oldest win out, have the alphabetically prior win out, etc. In the event of a "tie" it doesn't matter how the tie is broken—anything will get you the level of control wanted by Kane and other event-causal libertarians. So, here again, we shouldn't want to inject indeterminism into the picture.

Finally, consider the link between experiences and our mental states. Again, philosophers all agree that there must be some sort of link between our experiences and our mental states. For example, if what I believe is totally unconnected to what I perceive, consider, intuit, feel, etc., it's hard even to see how I am an agent. Agents are perceptive and reactive. They are "reasons-responsive" (*cf.* Fischer and Ravizza 1998). I believe that a computer is in front of me because of my perceptual experience. I believe that I ate breakfast this morning because of a memory. I want to eat lunch because of my experience of hunger. And so forth.

So, given that there must be some sort of connection between experience and what

we think, want, hope for, etc., we can ask how tight we would like this connection to be.Now here I think the answer is less obvious than in the first two cases. And, in fact, some philosophers have argued that free will would require that at least some level of indeterminism in the connection between our experiences and our mental states (e.g. Dennett 1978, Mele 1995).

But, in general, I think it is reasonable to want the connection to be as reliable and consistent as possible. I want my belief that there is a computer in front of me to be the inevitable result of my experiences of the world and not something else. It won't do to have the experience that there is a computer in front of me and yet form the belief that there is a chair in front of me. It won't do to have my choice of vacation spot the result of anything but my deliberations on the matter. And it won't do to have my beliefs about free will result from anything but my introspective experiences. I want my experiences, broadly construed, to be the sufficient conditions for my beliefs and desires.

As in earlier sections, an incompatibilist might respond here by saying that what we really want is something different: we want our mental states to be probabilistically related to our experiences but not determined by them or perhaps we want our experiences to be reasons for our mental states while not being sufficient conditions for them. But in each case, I think the very same reasons offered on behalf of the weaker connection suffice to show that we would want the stronger connection, too.

Start with the claim that it would be more valuable to have a probabilistic rather than determinate link between experiences and mental states. In short, suppose you want your experiences of the world to probabilistically cause your beliefs and desires. The reason you prefer this sort of connection over a random connection is obvious: you want your mental states to be the result of relevant features as opposed to irrelevant ones. That's why you don't want your mental states to be the result of random coin flips. But if what you want is to ensure that your mental states are not random, there is something better than probabilistic connection, namely, deterministic connection. And so if a probabilistic connection is valuable, a deterministic connection is even more so.

Or, to consider the option, suppose what you want is for your beliefs to be based on the reasons provided by your conscious experience. Here we face a dilemma. Suppose my experience DOES provide reason for a belief. In that case, you surely won't want to disrupt the process of belief formation with indeterminism. Or suppose that my experience does NOT provide reason for a belief (e.g. I have an irrational fear of cats, and an experience of cat-panic makes me believe that cats are evil). In that case, disrupting the flow between experience and belief makes me no better off, either: if I had to pick between my belief being determined by my conscious experience in a way that is not reasonable or my belief being indeterminately caused by a quantum wave collapse in a way that is not reasonable, I have no idea why I should prefer the latter to the former. And so adding indeterminism to this final link between experience and mental states is not something that we would want.

Hence, I conclude that we would not want indeterminism introduced at any of the three links in the sketch of the psychology of human choice. Indeterminism at any link would make us worse off. We wouldn't choose it if we could. But we would want to be free. Hence, freedom does not require indeterminism.

4. Objections

One might object to the foregoing argument in a number of ways. I list four objections here and show how they fail.

4.1 Indeterminism before the Experience: This argument assumes that the indeterminism would need to appear in one of three locations: between choice and action, between mental states and choice, or between experience and mental states. But what if the indeterminism is placed even further up the causal chain? In particular, there might be an indeterministic break between the environment and the experiences to which the environment gives rise. If so, we would have a break that appears nowhere on this sketch of human action, and that break might show how being free is valuable.

It's true that we can always place the determinism further up the causal chain. But that won't help the incompatibilist cause. Here's an illustration. Suppose you think that there's a God and at the moment of creation, it is indetermined what God will create. But once God creates a world, the causal order of that world is closed and what happens within the system is determined by its initial conditions and laws of nature.

In such a scenario, it would be futile for denizens of that creation to claim that the indeterministic break before the creation of the world somehow confers value on their later choices. The indeterminism is in the wrong "place." The same criticism can be made in response to the present objection. If we place the indeterminism further up the causal chain and "outside" of the agent, then the indeterminism is in the wrong "place." A break in the chain outside of me can't explain why I have a valuable property.

4.2 Desire ≠ Value: Just because we desire something, this doesn't imply that it is valuable. So even if it's true that we wouldn't want indeterminism anywhere in the causal picture, that doesn't show that it's not valuable that indeterminism be in the causal picture.

There are two ways to respond to this objection. First, the term 'value' can be dropped from the argument entirely and replaced with 'desire'. Free will is something we desire, regardless of whether it is objectively valuable (whatever that means). And the argument then proceeds the same way: since we desire free will but not indeterminism, the former can't require the latter. The central point here is that the value claim in the argument functions as a concept locator: it is plausible that there are multiple different concepts all covered by the same English expression 'free will'. Claims about what we value can be used to sort these concepts to "locate" the

conception that matters most. Doing so need not involve any appeals to substantive value theory.

The second response just insists that desire satisfaction is a valuable thing. If someone desires X, then, other things being equal, it is valuable to satisfy this desire. And so showing that we desire something is sufficient to show that it is valuable. Hence the case in §3 stands.

4.3 Closure of Desires: The value argument presented here assumes that since we don't want a necessary condition of incompatibilist freedom that this entails that we don't want incompatibilist freedom. But it does not follow from the fact that you desire X that you also desire each of the necessary conditions for X. To insist that it does is to endorse a kind of closure principle about desires. The idea is roughly that rational desires would be closed under known implication (e.g. S rationally desires X only if S also desires all of the known necessary conditions for X). But since this closure principle is false and yet the value argument assumes it, the value argument fails.

First, it's not true that the value argument requires that rational desires be closed under known implication.[15] The case in §3 for premise two in the value argument never invokes this premise. But, second, even if the case for premise two required the closure principle, it is a plausible one. If your desire for X is a rational one, then you will also desire everything you know to be a necessary condition for X. If you want to be free of cancer and know that being cancer-free requires a risky surgery, then you will want the surgery. Not to desire the surgery is irrational.

4.4 Independent Evidence for Incompatibilism: Incompatibilists have given stand alone arguments for why indeterminism is valuable—for example, it is required for moral responsibility, which we greatly want, etc. This paper wholly ignores those accounts.

That's true. It's also irrelevant. One can't respond to an argument for atheism by pointing out that there are also arguments out there for theism. That doesn't affect the strength of the argument under consideration. The same goes for value-driven arguments. The hedonist cannot respond to Robert Nozick by pointing out that the argument from the experience machine doesn't reckon with Mill's arguments for hedonism. The defender of the psychological continuity account of personal identity cannot respond to Bernard Williams by pointing out that the argument from the future doesn't' reckon with Locke's thought experiment about the prince and the pauper. And similarly, the incompatibilist cannot simply wave off this argument from value because it doesn't engage with the substantial literature purporting to show that incompatibilism is true.

Our value judgments should be taken as data for our philosophical theories to explain. While a wide reflective equilibrium might require us to give up initial value judgments or intuitions about cases, the fact that these are in tension with a theory

counts against it. And when it comes to free will, our value judgments are in tension with incompatibilist conceptions of the nature of free will; that is the point of this paper.

In short, reading contemporary accounts of incompatibilism is disturbing. If we stop to think about it, most of us wouldn't want to have the mental capacities that are described by these philosophers. And the fact that we wouldn't want to be this way ought to tell us something: incompatibilism is a mistake.

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Endnotes

[1] Some incompatibilists may allow that an action count as both free and determined as long as the determining factor can be traced back to an earlier state of affairs that was both under the agent's control and sufficiently indeterministic. This won't matter for purposes of the argument in this paper.

[2] In a recent survey, 59.1% of about 1,000 surveyed professional analytic philosophers leaned toward or accepted compatibilism whereas only 13.7% accepted libertarianism and 12.2% accepted the conclusion that we are not free. See Bourget and Chalmers 2014.

[3] See Nozick 1974.

[4] The name is due to Wayne Riggs in Riggs 2008.

[5] For example, the so-called "swamping problem" is such an objection for process reliabilism; see Zagzebski 1996, Swinburne 1999, Kvanvig 2003.

[6] For example, see the opening definition of free will in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry for Incompatibilism (Clark and Capes 2015).

[7] How could it be that I might be determined to eat the sandwich and yet it be true that I could have done otherwise? Well, the counterfactual analysis of 'could of done otherwise' says that an agent could have done otherwise just in case a counterfactual claim like the following is true: 'if the agent's mental states had been different, then her choice would have been different'. And since counterfactuals like this can be true

even if determinism is true, it follows trivially that it's possible for an action to be determined and yet it be true that the agent could have done otherwise.

[8] Examples of incompatibilists who explicitly agree on this basic definition are van Inwagen 1975 (p. 189) and Clarke 2003 (p. 3).

[9] For example, in the seminal Stanford entry on Incompatibilism, Clark and Capes 2015 explicitly say that performing an action "is exercising active control over what one does; acting freely is exercising an especially valuable variety of such control."

[10] There are many proposals in the literature for the value of free action. Free will has been identified as a requirement for the actualization of each of the following valuable states of affairs:

- human dignity & uniqueness (e.g. Dennett 1984, p. 153; Kane 1998, p. 85-7; Clarke 2003, p. 5)
- moral responsibility (e.g. van Inwagen 1983, p. 161; Kane 1998, p. 83; Dennett 1984, p. 153; Clarke 2003, p. 5; Strawson 2010, p. 1)
- being suitable candidates for reactive attitudes such as blame and praise (e.g. Kane 1998, p. 83-5)
- autonomy or sole authorship of our actions (e.g. Nagel 1986, p. 114; Kane 1998, p. 79)
- morally appropriate punishment (e.g. Strawson 2010, p. 2)
- genuine love, forgiveness, friendship, etc. (e.g. Kane 1998, p. 88;Strawson 2010, p. 270-2)
- moral obligation for actions other than those that we actually do (on the grounds that ought implies can)
- self-creation or world-creation (e.g. Dennett 1984, p. 169; Clarke 2003, p. 5)
- avoiding a routine and ubiquitous illusion (e.g. Clarke 2003, p. 7)
- avoiding inconsistent beliefs (e.g. van Inwagen 1983, p. 160)

[11] This premise need not be read as an existential. That is, it need not assert the conjunction that there is free will and that it is valuable. Such a premise won't be endorsed by any free will nihilist. The premise should be read as a counterfactual: were there free will, it would be a good thing. All participants in the debate should agree on this.

[12] Clarke 2003 hints at this sort of objection when he describes the chance/luck objection as raising "a serious challenge, a problem of *value* for a centered (and indeed any) event-causal libertarian account," (p. 93, emphasis mine).

[13] Thanks to [removed for blind review] for suggesting this response to premise one.

[14] 'Stronger' is a metaphor for whatever we take to be important about these mental states. It could be intensity of desire, correctness of reasons, or whatever.

[15] Thanks to Eric Olson for making this clear.